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1 Introduction
In this paper I study an oligopolistic market where firms compete via supply functions
and are subject to capacity constraints. I obtain conclusions substantially different
from those that have been obtained when ignoring capacity constraints. Specifically,
in the presence of capacity constraints, new equilibria may arise that lead to a lower
market price and a larger aggregated output. These results have important implica-
tions for the design of regulatory policies, and in particular for antitrust and merger
policies.
Consider an industry in which firms compete by simultaneously choosing a (non-
decreasing) supply function, and firms are capacity constrained, i.e. they cannot
supply beyond a certain quantity. Firms’ supply schedules are aggregated to form
the market supply function which together with the market demand determines the
market clearing price and firms’ outputs and profits. This model describes appropri-
ately markets such as, for example, the wholesale spot electricity markets in Spain
and in Britain.1 In such industries building new capacity takes a long time, and
therefore in the meantime firms must make production decision taking capacities as
given. In this context, the analysis of games of competition under exogenous capacity
constraints is relevant.
Competition via supply functions has been analyzed by several authors —see, e.g.,
[11], [12], [13], [15], [17]. In the absence of demand uncertainty, the set of market
outcomes that can arise in equilibrium is large.2 In many traditional industries such
as electricity generation there is a small number of firms with a long history in the
market. Thus, it is sensible to assume that firms discuss their strategies even if
they cannot make binding agreements. Therefore, some of the theoretically feasible
equilibrium outcomes might not arise in reality since some (coalitions of) firms may
1In Britain, the wholesale electriciy market operated in this way until 2001 when the pool was
replaced by a new trading system based on bilateral contracts. A similar institution is however still
used for balancing supply and residual demand once bilateral contracts have been settled. There
are several other countries that to some extent make use of this market institution in restructured
electricity markets, e.g., Australia, New Zealand, Nordic countries, Chile and several states of the
USA.
2Klemperer and Meyer [13] have shown, however, that with unbounded uncertainty equilibrium
may be unique.
1
block them in favor of some other mutually more profitable equilibrium outcomes.
In the analysis of such markets, it is therefore important to identify those equilibria
which are immune not just to deviations by individual firms but also to profitable
deviations by coalitions of firms. In such context, an equilibrium outcome would be
therefore more likely to arise if no firm or coalition of firms finds profitable to deviate
from such equilibrium. When the firms in the industry take into account the gains
they can attain by coordinating their actions, Delgado and Moreno [7] find that the
equilibrium multiplicity disappears when the number of firms is above a threshold,
and that the Cournot outcome is the unique outcome that can be sustained as an
equilibrium.
Green and Newbery [10] study the consequences of introducing capacity con-
straints in the model with (bounded) demand uncertainty,3 and conclude that “the
effect of capacity constraints is to narrow the range of feasible [Nash] equilibria and in
extreme cases (...) the equilibrium will be unique.” (This result also holds when de-
mand is known with certainty.) However, when firms in the industry take into account
the gains they can attain by coordinating their actions, the presence of sufficiently
asymmetric capacity constraints may increase the number of equilibrium outcomes.
Interestingly, these new outcomes involve market prices below the Cournot price. In
contrast, when firms’ capacities are nearly symmetric the Cournot outcome continues
to be the unique outcome that can be sustained as an equilibrium. These results have
important implications for antitrust policy and merger control: contrary to common
wisdom, more concentrated industries will not necessarily lead to higher prices.
In order to account for the coordination opportunities present in an industry, I use
the well-established notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) introduced
by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston [3]. This concept has been extensively used for the
analysis of coalitional games in a variety of environments —see, e.g., [4], [5], [7], [14],
[16]. The concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium identifies the strategy profiles
for which no coalition of players has an improving and self-enforcing deviation. A
deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further self-enforcing and improving deviation
available to a proper subcoalition of a deviating coalition. Note that since all indi-
3Baldick and Hogan [2] provide an analytical solution to a model of competition via supply
functions with capacity constraints and analyze the properties and stability of the different possible
equilibria.
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vidual deviations are self-enforcing, a CPNE is a Nash equilibrium. However, a Nash
equilibrium need not be a CPNE.
In the context of this paper, a Nash equilibrium is referred to as a supply func-
tion equilibrium (SFE), and a CPNE is referred as a coalition-proof supply function
equilibrium (CPSFE). In order to identify the outcomes that can be sustained by
CPSFE, I begin by identifying the set of outcomes that can be sustained by SFE in
the presence of capacity constraints. I show that any SFE leads to a price not higher
than the capacity-constrained Cournot price but strictly higher than the so-called
capacity-constrained competitive price. The capacity-constrained Cournot price is
the price resulting from firms competing ‘a la Cournot’ in an industry with capacity
constraints. The capacity-constrained competitive price is the minimum feasible price
at which no firm produces below its marginal cost.
Next I prove that a coalition-proof Nash equilibria exists in this framework. In
particular, I show that the capacity-constrained Cournot outcome can always be sus-
tained by CPSFE, and hence that a CPSFE exists. Moreover, I show that under
symmetric capacity constraints, the capacity-constrained Cournot outcome is the
unique CPSFE outcome under the conditions established by Delgado and Moreno
[7].4
When capacities are not symmetric, however, this result does not necessarily hold.
Even if the capacities of all firms are above the Cournot output, the conditions that
guarantee uniqueness of CPSFE outcomes in the absence of capacity constraints
may not guarantee uniqueness when capacity constraints are present. The intuition
behind this result is that if at some equilibrium the capacities of a number of firms
are binding, the remaining firms can induce higher prices in the residual industry
without fearing reactions from the former. Interestingly, the new equilibrium prices
are below the Cournot price (which is the highest price that can be sustained by
CPSFE.)
Finally, the paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee the
existence of a unique CPSFE outcome when the market demand and the cost func-
tions are linear. In particular, it is shown that if capacity constraints are sufficiently
symmetric, any CPSFE leads to the Cournot outcome. In contrast, if capacities are
4See Theorem 3.7 in Delgado and Moreno [7].
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sufficiently asymmetric other outcomes can be sustained by CPSFE in addition to
the Cournot outcome.
These results have interesting policy implications. In particular, they imply that
certain asymmetric distributions of capacities may lead to prices below those that
arise under symmetric (or nearly symmetric) capacity distributions. The intuition of
this result is that in an oligopoly where firms compete via supply functions, larger
firms may find more profitable to expand their output (i.e., behaving as Stackelberg
leaders on the residual demand) rather than to increase the price.
This is of particular relevance for the design of merger policies and privatization
strategies. In the case of merger analysis, the use of concentration indexes might
be misleading since they may not be directly related to the market price (even in
the absence of efficiency gains.) Mergers leading to more symmetric market struc-
tures may result in higher prices than mergers resulting in more asymmetric market
structures. Similarly, a policymaker facing the break-up of a monopoly may wish to
favor asymmetric distributions of capacities rather than symmetric ones in order to
induce lower market prices. However, not all asymmetric distributions of capacities
will achieve this goal. This will be further developed in the last section of the paper.
2 Supply Function Equilibria
2.1 The industry
Consider an oligopolistic industry where firms compete in the production of a ho-
mogeneous good. The industry demand, D : R+ → R+, is known to all firms with
certainty.5 Throughout it is assumed that D is a twice continuously differentiable
strictly decreasing and concave function6 on (0, ρ), where ρ > 0 satisfies D (p) > 0
for p < ρ, and D (p) = 0 for p ≥ ρ. All firms have access to the same technology,
and therefore have identical cost function, C : R→ R; I assume that C is twice con-
tinuously differentiable, non-decreasing and convex on R+, and satisfies C 0(0) < ρ,
5In many markets the demand can be anticipated with a great accuracy, and therefore uncertainty
plays a small role. This is the case, for example, in the spot electricity market in Spain where each
firm submits a bid for each of the (24 one-hour) periods in which the market is divided.
6Concavity of demand is not strictly required for the profit function to be concave but is assumed
for technical convenience.
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and C(q) = C(0) for q ≤ 0. (Extending the domain of the cost function to include
negative quantities is inconsequential and simplifies our analysis.) Write N for the
set of firms {1, ..., n}, where n ≥ 2. Firms are capacity-constrained in the sense that
Firm i cannot produce above a certain quantity ki > 0.
An industry is therefore described by the vector (D,C,N, k), indicating the market
demand, D, the firms’ cost function, C, the set of firms N and the firm’s capacities
k = (k1, k2, ..., kn). Without loss of generality, let ki ≥ ki+1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}. In
what follows, let us be given an industry (D,C,N, k).
2.2 Equilibria
Firms compete by simultaneously choosing a function ri (p); where ri (p) is a non-
decreasing real-valued function on [0, ρ] continuously differentiable on (0, ρ). Firm i’s
supply function si (p) is equal to ri (p) for ri (p) < ki and to ki otherwise, i.e.,
si (p) =



ri (p) if ri (p) < ki
ki otherwise.
For a profile of supply functions s = (s1, . . . , sn), a market clearing price is a solution
to the equation
nX
i=1
si (p) = D (p) . (MC)
The assumptions on the market demand and the firms’ supply functions guarantee
that if a market clearing price exists, then it is unique7. For each profile of supply
functions s, let p(s) be the market clearing price if it exists, and let p(s) be zero if
a market clearing price does not exist. Firm i’s profits (payoff) are given by πi(s) =
p(s)si(p(s))−C(si(p(s))). (This construction implicitly assumes that firms’ revenues
are zero when a market clearing price does not exist.)
A supply function equilibrium (SFE henceforth) is a (pure strategy) Nash equi-
librium of the game described. Write SFE(D,C,N, k) for the set of supply func-
tion equilibria. In a SFE each firm maximizes profits, subject to its capacity con-
straint, on its “residual demand”. Let sˆ ∈ SFE(D,C,N, k) and p (sˆ) = pˆ. Write
7In contrast to traditional capacity-constrained oligopoly models in which consumers are allowed
to buy at different prices and, thus, a rationing rule has to be specified, here the market price is
determined by the market clearing price and all transactions are made at the same price.
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N (sˆ) = {i ∈ N | sˆi (pˆ) < ki} and n (sˆ) = #N (sˆ). Then, for each i ∈ N , pˆ solves
max
p∈[0,ρ]
p
³
D(p)−
P
j 6=i sˆj(p)
´
− C
³
D(p)−
P
j 6=i sˆj(p)
´
s.t. D(p)−
P
j 6=i sˆj(p) ≤ ki.
If pˆ ∈ (0, ρ), then, for each i ∈ N , sˆ satisfies
D(pˆ)−
X
j 6=i
sˆj (pˆ) +
+

D
0 (pˆ)−
X
j 6=i
j∈N(sˆ)
rˆ0j(pˆ)


Ã
pˆ− C 0
Ã
D(pˆ)−
X
j 6=i
sˆj (pˆ)
!
− λi
!
= 0,
where λi ≥ 0 (λi = 0 if D(pˆ)−
P
j 6=i sˆj (pˆ) < ki). Using the market clearing condition
(MC) and writing qˆi = D(pˆ) −
P
j 6=i sˆj(pˆ), this condition can be written, for each
i ∈ N , as
qˆi +

D
0 (pˆ)−
X
j 6=i
j∈N(sˆ)
rˆ0j(pˆ)

 (pˆ− C
0(qˆi)− λi) = 0, (Ei)
where λi ≥ 0. If in addition each rˆi is a convex function, then satisfying Ei for
i ∈ N is a sufficient condition for a strategy profile sˆ to be a SFE.
If Firm i’s capacity is binding at the equilibrium price pˆ, condition Ei becomes
ki +

D
0 (pˆ)−
X
j 6=i
j∈N(sˆ)
rˆ0j(pˆ)

 (pˆ− C
0(ki)− λi) = 0, (Ei1)
where λi ≥ 0. If Firm i’s capacity is not binding at the equilibrium price pˆ, condition
Ei becomes
qˆi +

D
0 (pˆ)−
X
j 6=i
j∈N(sˆ)
rˆ0j(pˆ)

 (pˆ− C
0(qˆi)) = 0. (Ei2)
For s ∈ SFE(D,C,N, k), denote by (p(s), q1(s), . . . , qn(s)) the associated market
outcome.
Next, the definitions of the Cournot price and the competitive price are adapted
to the scenario with capacity constraints. Those prices will play an important role in
determining the set of prices that can be sustained by SFE.
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In the industry without capacity constraints (D,C,N), the Cournot outcome
(p¯, q¯1, . . . , q¯n) is characterized by the system of equations
8
q¯i + (p¯− C 0 (q¯i))D0 (p¯) = 0, ∀i ∈ N, (C¯1)
and
nX
i=1
q¯i = D (p¯) . (C¯2)
Given the industry (D,C,N, k), define Ni = {1, ..., i} and let Dk,Ni (p) be the
residual demand when the set of firms N\Ni = {i+ 1, ..., n} produce at full capacity.
Thus Dk,Ni is given for p ∈ R+ by
Dk,Ni (p) =



D (p)−
P
j>i kj if D (p)−
P
j>i kj ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
Also define
N¯ = {j ∈ N | kj > q¯
¡
Dk,Nj , C,Nj
¢}.
Note that since by definition kj ≥ ki for j < i, then i ∈ N¯ implies j ∈ N¯ for j < i.
Let n¯ = max
©
j ∈ N¯
ª
if N¯ 6= {∅} , and n¯ = 0 if N¯ = {∅} . Thus, N¯ = {i ∈ N | i ≤ n¯}
is the set of firms which capacities are strictly larger than the Cournot output in the
(residual) industry
¡
Dk,N¯ , C, N¯
¢
. Likewise, N\N¯ = {i ∈ N | i > n¯} is the set of firms
that do not have sufficient capacity to produce the Cournot quantity in the industry¡
Dk,N¯ , C, N¯
¢
for i ≥ n¯ + 1. If n¯ = 0 then no firm has enough capacity to produce
the Cournot quantity in the industry
¡
Dk,Nj , C,Nj
¢
for every possible value of j. In
particular, this will happen when the largest firm does not have enough capacity to
produce the profit maximizing quantity in the residual industry where all firms but
the largest firm produce all their capacity.
Thus, ∀i ≤ n¯, Firm i has enough capacity to produce more than the Cournot
quantity when firms in N\N¯ = {n¯+ 1, ..., n} produce at full capacity.
In the industry (D,C,N, k), a capacity-constrained Cournot outcome (p¯, q¯1, . . . , q¯n)
is characterized by the system of equations
q¯i + (p¯− C 0 (q¯i))D0 (p¯) = 0, for i ∈ N¯, (C¯1k)
8These equations characterize the Cournot equilibrium in a quantity-setting oligopoly game.
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q¯i = ki, for i ∈ N\N¯, (C¯2k)
and
nX
i=1
q¯i = D (p¯) . (C¯3k)
Equations C¯1k and C¯2k ensure that each firm maximizes profits, whereas C¯3k ensures
that the market clears. The assumptions on demand and cost functions imply the
existence of a unique capacity-constrained Cournot outcome, which is symmetric for
all i ≤ n¯ (i.e., satisfies q¯1 = . . . = q¯n¯ = q¯).
Given an industry (D,C,N, k), I denote by p¯(D,C,N, k) the capacity-constrained
Cournot price. The capacity-constrained Cournot price coincides with the equilib-
rium price resulting from firms competing ‘a la Cournot’ in a capacity-constrained
industry. Therefore, if N ≡ N¯ , then p¯(D,C,N, k) = p¯(D,C,N) and q¯i(D,C,N, k) =
q¯(D,C,N), whereas if N¯ = {∅} then p¯(D,C,N, k) is the solution to the equationPn
i=1 ki = D (p¯). Note also that p¯(D,C,N, k) = p¯(Dk,N¯ , C, N¯), i.e. the capacity-
constrained Cournot price for the industry (D,C,N, k) coincides with the Cournot
price of the industry (Dk,N¯ , C, N¯).
For i ∈ N¯, let q¯i(D,C,N, k) = q¯(D,C,N, k).9 Note that q¯(D,C,N, k) = q¯(Dk,N¯ , C, N¯).
In the industry without capacity constraints (D,C,N), a competitive outcome
(p, q
1
, . . . , q
n
) satisfies the system of equations
C 0
³
q
i
´
= p, (C1)
for i ∈ N , and
nX
i=1
q
i
= D(p). (C2)
Given the industry (D,C,N, k), define
N =
½
j ∈ N | kj > 1
j
Dk,Nj
¡
p
¡
Dk,Nj , C,Nj
¢¢¾
.
Again, note that since kj ≥ ki for j < i, i ∈ N implies j ∈ N for j < i. Let
n = max{j ∈ N} if N 6= {∅} and n = 0 if N = {∅} . If n > 0, the capacity-constrained
competitive price p (D,C,N, k) is defined by p (D,C,N, k) = p (DN , C,N). If n = 0,
9Note that for i ∈ N¯ the Cournot outcome is symmetric.
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the capacity-constrained competitive price p (D,C,N, k) is defined by p (D,C,N, k) =
D−1 (
Pn
i=1 ki).
Clearly,
0 ≤ p(D,C,N, k) ≤ p¯(D,C,N, k) < ρ.
2.3 Results
Write SFEp (D,C,N, k) for the set of prices that can be sustained by SFE, i.e. if
p ∈ SFEp (D,C,N, k) then there exists s ∈ SFE (D,C,N, k) such that p (s) = p.
Theorem 2.1 below establishes that the set of prices that can be sustained by
SFE in an industry with capacity constraints is the half open interval containing the
prices between the capacity-constrained competitive price and capacity-constrained
Cournot price. The proof can be easily adapted from the proof of Theorem 2.2 in [7]
and is omitted.
Theorem 2.1. SFEp (D,C,N, k) =
¡
p(D,C,N, k), p¯ (D,C,N, k)
¤
.
Delgado and Moreno [7] show that in the absence of capacity constraints the
set of prices that can be sustained is
¡
p(D,C,N), p¯ (D,C,N)
¤
. Since p(D,C,N) ≤
p(D,C,N, k) and p¯ (D,C,N) ≤ p¯ (D,C,N, k) , both the lower and the upper bound
of the equilibrium price set may increase in the presence of capacity constraints.
Therefore, in the presence of capacity constraints higher prices might be sustained by
SFE. As stated by Corollary 2.2, in the extreme case where N¯ 6= {∅} , p(D,C,N, k) =
p¯ (D,C,N, k), i.e. the equilibrium outcome will be unique.
Corollary 2.2. Let (D,C,N, k) be an industry. If N¯ = {∅} , then every s ∈
SFE(D,C,N, k) satisfies p(s) = D−1 (
Pn
i=1 ki) and qi (s) = ki for i ∈ N.
The proof derives trivially from Theorem 2.1. When N¯ 6= {∅} no firm will have
sufficient capacity to produce the unconstrained Cournot quantity and therefore, at
any equilibrium outcome every firm will produce all its capacity, i.e. qi (s) = ki. Thus,
the set of prices that can be sustained by SFE will be reduced to p¯ (D,C,N, k) =
D−1 (
Pn
i=1 ki).
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3 Coalition-Proof Supply Function Equilibria
In this section the concept of coalition-proof supply function equilibrium is introduced
and it is shown that under capacity constraints a coalition-proof supply function
equilibrium exists.
3.1 The notion of coalition-proof supply function equilibrium
The notion of coalition-proof supply function equilibrium (CPSFE) identifies the SFE
which are self-enforcing in the stronger sense that neither individual firms nor coali-
tions of firms have credible improving deviations. The notion of CPSFE is an adap-
tation of the concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium introduced by Bernheim,
Peleg and Whinston [3].10 The concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium relates to
Aumann’s concept of strong Nash equilibrium (see [1]). A strategy profile is a strong
equilibrium if no coalition can profitably deviate from the prescribed profile. The
concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium limits the set of admissible deviations:
only those deviations which are immune to further deviations of subcoalitions are
valid deviations.11
The following formal definition adapts the concept of CPSFE defined in [7] to
industries with capacity constraints.
Let (D,C,N, k) be an industry. Denote by 2N the set of all possible coalitions.
For a strategy profile s and a coalition M ∈ 2N , write sM for the profile of supply
functions of the members of M , and write m for the cardinality of the set M . Let s
be a strategy profile and let M ∈ 2N , 2 ≤ m < n, be a coalition of firms (recall that
10See also [4] for the application of this concept to the Cournot quantity competition game and to
several other well-known games. Delgado and Moreno [7] use this concept in a market where firms
complete via supply functions. Chowdhury and Sengupta [5] analyse the existence of CPNE in a
Bertrand price competition environment.
11The notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is the most widely used noncooperative coali-
tional equilibrium concept. The concept is not, however, absent of difficulties and criticisms. The
existence of a Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium, for example, is difficult to prove even in simple
games (see [4].) One of the main criticisms to this concept is that it assumes passive behavior on
the part of coalitions complementary to the deviating coalition. Moreover there is not a dynamic
concept of CPNE which is generally accepted (see e.g. [9] for a discussion and a possible definition
of CPNE in extensive form games.)
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n ≥ 2). Holding fixed the strategies of the members of the complementary coalition,
sN\M , the situation the group of firms in M faces can be modeled as that of an
“industry” (Ds,M , C,M, k), where Ds,M is given for p ∈ R+ by
Ds,M(p) =



D(p)−
P
i∈N\M si(p) if D(p)−
P
i∈N\M si(p) ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
This recursive structure allows us to formalize the notion of CPSFE.
Coalition-Proof Supply Function Equilibrium: Let (D,C,N, k) be an industry.
(1) If n = 2, a coalition-proof supply function equilibrium is a strategy profile s ∈
SFE(D,C,N, k) such that there is no s˜ ∈ SFE(D,C,N, k) satisfying πi(s˜) > πi(s)
for i ∈ N .
(2) Let n > 2 and assume that the notion of coalition-proof supply function equi-
librium has been defined for industries with fewer than n firms.
(i) A strategy profile s is self-enforcing if s ∈ SFE(D,C,N, k), and if for
all M ∈ 2N , 2 ≤ m < n, sM is a coalition-proof supply function equilibrium of the
industry (Ds,M , C,M, k).
(ii) A strategy profile s is a coalition-proof supply function equilibrium if it is
self-enforcing and if there is no self-enforcing strategy s˜ such that πi (s˜) > πi (s) for
i ∈ N .
The definition of CPSFE applies to industries with no fewer than two firms. Note
that a CPSFE is a SFE, and therefore it is invulnerable to deviations by a single firm.
Given an industry (D,C,N, k), write CPSFE(D,C,N, k) for the set of coalition-
proof supply function equilibria.
3.2 Existence
Theorem 3.1 establishes that every capacity-constrained industry has a CPSFE. In
fact, it is shown that the capacity-constrained Cournot outcome can be sustained by
CPSFE. Theorem 3.1 below is an extension of Theorem 3.1 in [7] for industries with
capacity constraints.
Theorem 3.1. Every industry (D,C,N, k) has a coalition-proof supply function equi-
librium. Moreover, there is s ∈ CPSFE(D,C,N, k) such that p(s) = p¯(D,C,N, k).
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4 Uniqueness of coalition-proof supply function equi-
librium outcome
Delgado and Moreno [7] study conditions under which the Cournot outcome is the
unique outcome that can be sustained by a CPSFE in the industry without capacity
constraints (D,C,N). In particular, they show that under appropriate conditions on
the demand and cost functions, the number
n∗ = 2 +
D0(p¯) +D00(p¯) (p¯− C 0(q¯))
D0(p¯) (1−D0(p¯)C 00(q¯))
where p¯ = p¯ (D,C,N), provides a threshold on the number of firms that guarantees
that if n ≥ n∗, then the Cournot outcome is the unique outcome that can be sustained
by CPSFE in the industry (D,C,N). For example, if the demand function is linear,
n∗ = 3.
Henceforth, it is assumed that D and C satisfy the appropriate conditions that
guarantee that for n ≥ n∗ the Cournot outcome is the unique outcome that can be
sustained by CPSFE in the industry without capacity constraints (D,C,N).12
In the next subsections I will show that this condition is not sufficient to guarantee
the uniqueness result in the presence of capacity constraints. It will be shown that if
capacities are symmetric then n ≥ n∗ guarantees the uniqueness of CPSFE outcome
under capacity constraints. However, as it will be also be shown, in the presence of
asymmetric capacity constraints this condition does not always guarantee the above
result.
4.1 Symmetric capacities
In this subsection I show that under symmetric capacity constraints there is a unique
CPSFE outcome. Therefore the presence of symmetric capacity constraints does not
alter the result of existence of a unique CPSFE outcome which coincides with the
Cournot outcome.
Proposition 4.1 below shows that if firms’ capacities are symmetric, then the
unique outcome that can be sustained by CPSFE is the capacity-constrained Cournot
12Such conditions relate to the curvature of the demand and cost functions. See Theorem 3.7 in
Delgado and Moreno [7].
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outcome. The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.1. Let (D,C,N, k) be an industry. If capacities are symmetric and
n ≥ n∗ then
(p(s), q1(s), . . . , qn(s)) = (p¯(D,C,N, k), q¯(D,C,N, k), . . . , q¯(D,C,N, k))
for all s ∈ CPSFE(D,C,N, k).
If capacities are below the Cournot output there is a unique SFE outcome and
therefore Proposition 4.1 derives trivially from Corollary 2.2 and Theorem 3.1. If
capacities are above the ‘unconstrained’ Cournot output, the above proposition indi-
cates that capacity constraints play no role at the unique equilibrium outcome and
the equilibrium outcome of the game with capacity constraints thus coincides with
that of the game without capacity constraints.
As in the absence of capacity constraints, under symmetric capacity constraints
n ≥ n∗ is a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique CPSFE outcome. This
means that the Cournot quantity-setting model provides a “reduced form” of a “struc-
tural model” where capacity-constrained symmetric firms compete via supply func-
tions taking into account the coordination possibilities present in the industry.
4.2 Asymmetric capacities
This subsection analyses whether the existence of a unique CPSFE outcome holds
under asymmetric capacity constraints. As it will be shown, this will not always
be the case even if every firm in the industry has enough capacity to produce the
Cournot quantity. Surprisingly, under some asymmetric distributions of capacities,
CPSFE outcomes other than Cournot may yield. Since the Cournot price is the
highest equilibrium price, such new CPSFE outcomes will necessarily imply prices
lower than the Cournot price. In this subsection I identify the necessary and sufficient
conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique CPSFE outcome in an industry
with linear demand and cost functions. A result that plays an important role in the
search of these conditions is the fact that in any CPSFE resulting in an outcome
other than Cournot there must be at least n − n∗ firms with binding capacities at
13
such equilibrium (which implies that if the capacity of the smallest n − n∗ firms is
sufficiently large then no CPSFE resulting in an outcome other than Cournot exists.)
It is easy to construct examples where n ≥ n∗ > n¯ (i.e., the number of firms
with above-Cournot capacity is less than n∗) and there are outcomes other than the
capacity-constrained Cournot outcome that can be sustained by CPSFE. Consider
the industry (D,C,N, k) where n¯ < n∗ and let s ∈ SFE (D,C,N, k) be such that
qi (s) = ki ∀i > n¯. Since uniqueness of CPSFE outcomes cannot be guaranteed in the
“residual industry”
¡
Dk,N¯ , C, N¯, k
¢
. for n¯ < n∗, then uniqueness of CPSFE outcomes
cannot be guaranteed in (D,C,N, k) either, even though n ≥ n∗.
Further, neither the condition n ≥ n¯ ≥ n∗ guarantees the uniqueness of CPSFE
outcomes, as Example 4.2 below shows. Note that in this example all firms in the
industry have enough capacity to produce the Cournot quantity. Thus, the unique-
ness result established by Delgado and Moreno [7] does not necessarily hold under
asymmetric capacities.
Example 4.2. Consider the industry (D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k) where C (q) = 0 for q ∈ R,
D (p) = 100 − p for p ∈ [0, 100], and k = (35, 30, 28). Note that p¯ (D,C,N, k) =
p¯ (D,C,N) = 25 and q¯ (D,C,N, k) = q¯ (D,C,N) = 25.
Consider the strategy sˆ such that
sˆ1 (p) = 30 ∀p,
sˆ2 (p) =



12 + 3
7
p if p < 42,
30 if p ≥ 42,
sˆ3 (p) = 28 ∀p.
It is easy to prove that sˆ ∈ SFE(D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k) where
(p (sˆ) , q1 (sˆ) , q2 (sˆ) , q3 (sˆ)) = (21, 30, 21, 28) .
Firms’ profits are π1 (sˆ) = 630 > π¯ = 625, π2 (sˆ) = 441 and π3 (sˆ) = 588.
In the Appendix it is shown that sˆ ∈ CPSFE (D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k). For this, it is
shown that sˆ is self-enforcing and that there is no self-enforcing strategy s˜ such that
πi (s˜) > πi (sˆ) for i ∈ N .
Note that since the Cournot price is the highest price that can be sustained by
SFE, any alternative CPSFE will necessarily imply a price lower than the Cournot
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price. Thus, some forms of asymmetry might be desirable from a welfare perspective
since they may allow for the possibility of existence of lower equilibrium prices.13
This will be further commented in the final section.
Having shown that the presence of asymmetric capacity constraints may invali-
date the uniqueness of CPSFE outcomes I proceed to investigate which additional
conditions are needed in order to guarantee the existence of a unique CPSFE outcome.
Proposition 4.3 below specifies how any additional CPSFE outcome will look
like. In particular, the proposition shows that any SFE at which n∗ or more firms
produce under capacity cannot be CPSFE. The proof of this proposition is given in
the Appendix.
Proposition 4.3. Let (D,C,N, k) be an industry such that n ≥ n∗.
If s ∈ CPSFE(D,C,N, k) such that p (s) < p¯(D,C,N, k), then n− n (s) < n∗.
The idea behind the proof of the above proposition is the following: assume there
is an SFE at which the capacities of the coalition N 0 ⊆ N (where #N 0 ≥ n∗) are
not binding. Thus, the deviation of the coalition formed by the firms in N 0 to a SFE
resulting in the Cournot outcome is self-enforcing and implies larger profits for all
the members of the coalition. Thus, the initial SFE cannot be a CPSFE.
The previous result restricts the search of additional CPSFE to the family of SFE
outcomes in which less than n∗ firms produce under their capacity.
Next, I analyze the conditions under which CPSFE outcome uniqueness holds
in a capacity-constrained linear industry. A capacity-constrained linear industry is
described by a linear demand function, (i.e., D(p) = a − bp, for p ∈ [0, a
b
], where
a, b ∈ R+), and a linear cost function (i.e., C(q) = cq, for q ≥ 0, where c ∈ R+). The
assumption that C 0(0) < ρ implies c < a
b
. Thus, a linear industry is described by the
parameters a, b, c, a set of firms N and a vector of capacities k = (k1, ..., kn).
Delgado and Moreno [7] show that in a linear industry (without capacity con-
straints) n ≥ 3 (= n∗) is a sufficient condition for the Cournot outcome to be the
unique outcome that can be sustained by CPSFE.
13Note however that in Example 4.2 the Cournot outcome can also by sustained by CPSFE.
Therefore, although the presence of asymmetries may allow for the existence of equilibrium outcomes
other than Cournot, there is no guarantee that the resulting equilibrium price will be stictly lower
than the Cournot price.
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Proposition 4.3 established that if additional CPSFE exist then, the number of
firms which capacity is not binding at such equilibria must be less than n∗. Thus, in
the case of a linear industry, any CPSFE leading to an outcome other than Cournot
must involve at most two firms producing below their capacity. The search of ad-
ditional CPSFE in a linear industry can then be restricted to the family of SFE in
which less than three firms produce below their capacity.
Consider first the case where n¯ = 0, i.e. no firm has enough capacity to produce
the Cournot quantity. Then, from Corollary 2.2 and Theorem 3.3, there is a unique
SFE outcome which is also the unique CPSFE outcome.
Next, consider the case where 0 < n¯ < n∗ = 3. The capacity-constrained Cournot
outcome involves the n− n¯ smallest firms producing at full capacity and the n¯ largest
firms producing the (unconstrained) Cournot output on the “residual demand” (see
the definition of capacity-constrained Cournot outcome in section 2.2.) Consider the
game faced by Firms {1, ..., n¯} when the n− n¯ smallest firms produce at full capacity.
Firms {1, ..., n¯} confront the residual linear industry ¡Dk,N¯ , C, N¯, k¢. In a linear
industry
¡
Dk,N¯ , C, N¯
¢
, where n¯ < 3, there are several outcomes that can be sustained
by CPSFE. In particular, any equilibrium outcome that is not Pareto-dominated by
the Cournot outcome constitutes a CPSFE. As some of those equilibria may also be
sustained by SFE in the industry
¡
Dk,N¯ , C, N¯, k
¢
, the existence of a unique CPSFE
is not guaranteed for 0 < n¯ < n∗.
Most interestingly, consider finally the case where n∗ ≤ n¯. Let us start with the
case of a linear industry where n¯ = n∗ = 3, i.e. there are three firms in the industry
and the capacities of all three are above the Cournot quantity. Figure 1 illustrates
the combination of capacities for which there is a unique CPSFE (which results in the
Cournot outcome.) The horizontal axis represents the capacity of the largest firm,
i.e. Firm 1, while the vertical axis represents the capacity of Firm 3. The shaded area
represents the combination of capacities for which a unique CPSFE outcome exists
(which includes the case of symmetric capacities, i.e. k1 = k2 = k3.) Note that, since
by assumption k1 ≥ k3, only the area below the 45-degree line is relevant.
In this area, either the capacity of the largest firm is not sufficiently large (in
comparison to the capacity of the smallest firm) and all possible SFE result in prof-
its lower than the Cournot profits (Area B) or the capacity of the smallest firm
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Figure 1:
is sufficiently large and there is no room to obtain above-Cournot profits when the
capacity of Firm 3 is binding at equilibrium (Area C). In Areas B and C, the capacity-
constrained Cournot outcome is the only market outcome that can be sustained by
CPSFE. In the area below the shaded area (Area A), where the capacity of Firm 3
is sufficiently small, the uniqueness of a CPSFE outcome is not guaranteed and, in
fact, outcomes other than the Cournot outcome can be sustained by CPSFE.
Theorem 4.4 formalizes the previous illustration for any n¯ ≥ n∗ = 3. In particular,
Theorem 4.4 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot outcome to
be the unique outcome that can be sustained by CPSFE under capacity constraints
for n¯ ≥ n∗. As shown in Figure 1, such conditions imply that firms are “sufficiently”
symmetric.Denote bk = √2
n+1
(a− bc) . The following conditions linking the capacities
of the different firms in the industry will be useful for establishing Theorem 4.4:
— Condition 4.4.1. k1 < bk and Pi>2 ki > a− bc− k1 − bk2k1 ;
— Condition 4.4.2. k1 ≥ bk and Pi>2 ki > a− bc− 2bk.
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Conditions 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 describe respectively regions B and C in Figure 1.
Under 4.4.1 the largest firm is “too small” whereas under 4.4.2 the smaller firms are
“too big”. In both regions, any SFE is areto-dominated by the Cournot outcome.
If capacities fall out of such regions CPSFE resulting in outcomes other than the
Cournot outcome exist. The proof of this result is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.4. Let (D,C,N, k) be a capacity-constrained linear industry where n¯ ≥
3. The capacity-constrained Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome if and
only if either 4.4.1 or 4.4.2 holds.
The following Remark shows that in linear industries Proposition 4.1 is a particu-
lar case of Theorem 4.4 since under symmetric capacity constraints either Condition
4.4.1 or Condition 4.4.2 holds. The proof is mechanical and is therefore omitted.
Remark 4.5. Consider the linear industry (D,C,N, k) where n ≥ 3; k = (k1, ..., k1)
and N ≡ N¯ . Then, either Condition 4.4.1 or Condition 4.4.2 holds and therefore the
Cournot outcome is the unique outcome that can be sustained by CPSFE.
The following examples show some cases where either 4.4.1 or 4.4.2 does not hold
and therefore there are CPSFE resulting in outcomes other than Cournot.
Example 4.6. Recall Example 4.2. Note that q¯ = 25 < k1 = 35 < bk = 25√2 but
k3 = 28 < 100 − k1 −
bk2
k1
= 205
7
(i.e. Condition 4.4.1 does not hold.) Example 4.2
shows that there is a strategy sˆ ∈ CPSFE(D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k) which leads to a price
lower than the Cournot price.
Example 4.7. Consider the industry (D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k) where C (q) = 0 for q ∈ R,
D (p) = 100− p for p ∈ [0, 100], and k = (40, 40, 28). Note that k1 = 40 > bk = 25√2
but k3 = 28 < 100− 2bk = 29.28 (i.e. Condition 4.4.2 does not hold.)
As shown in the proof of Theorem 4.4, the strategy sˆ such that
sˆ1 (p) = 36 ∀p,
sˆ2 (p) =



p if p < 30,
30 if p ≥ 30,
sˆ3 (p) = 28 ∀p.
resulting in the outcome
(p (sˆ) , q1 (sˆ) , q2 (sˆ) , q3 (sˆ)) = (18, 36, 18, 28)
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constitutes a CPSFE.
Note that the proof of the sufficient conditions of Theorem 4.4 is based on the
fact that the unique CPSFE outcome (i.e., the Cournot outcome) is Pareto-optimal
within the set of SFE outcomes. This will happen for any demand/cost structure
when capacities exceed some threshold. Therefore, for sufficiently large capacities
(no matter how asymmetric they are), the Cournot outcome is the only outcome that
can be sustained by CPSFE.
5 Policy Implications
The above results show that the standard industry concentration measures (such as
the Herfindahl index,) whether applied to the distribution of the industry capacity
or to the market shares, might not be useful to determine the level of prices in
a market. As shown, in a market where firms compete via supply functions and
are capacity constrained, some asymmetric distributions of capacities may give rise
to equilibria where market shares are asymmetric and the market price is below
the Cournot price, whereas symmetric distributions of capacities (which imply lower
industry concentration) give rise to the Cournot price. Therefore, the number of firms
being constant, more concentrated industry structures may give rise to lower market
prices than less concentrated market structures.
The next subsections discuss the implication of this result in connection to two
policy problems: the break-up of a monopoly and merger policy.
5.1 Policy guidelines to break up a monopoly
Consider a policymaker facing the problem of breaking up a monopoly into multiple
firms in order to introduce competition.14 Assume the number of firms is determined
exogenously and the policymaker has to decide on how to allocate the existing ca-
pacity among them. Assume the objective of the policymaker is to induce the lowest
possible price. What can the policymaker learn from the previous results?15
14This was, for example, the problem faced by the UK government when privatizing and liberal-
izing the electricity generation industry that was previously a state monopoly.
15I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the current format of this example.
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The policymaker has basically three alternatives:16 Either (a) allocating capacities
in such a way that some firms cannot produce the ‘unconstrained’ Cournot quantity;
or (b) allocating capacities asymmetrically in such a way that all firms can produce at
least the Cournot output and there are multiple CPSFE outcomes; or (c) allocating
capacities (quasi) symmetrically in such a way that all firms can produce at least
the Cournot output and there is a unique CPSFE output. Note that the highest
equilibrium price (i.e. the capacity-constrained Cournot price) will be higher in case
(a) than in cases (b) or (c) —see Theorem 2.1. In addition, note that option (b) may
yield other equilibrium prices which are below the Cournot price while in option (c)
there would be a unique equilibrium price. Therefore, option (b) seems the right
choice since in the worse case it will yield a price equal to option (c) but it could also
yield lower prices.
Thus, the policymaker should on the one hand allow every firm to have sufficient
capacity to produce the Cournot output and, on the other hand, allocate the total
capacity asymmetrically in order to allow for the existence of multiple equilibria. This
is easily shown by means of an example.
Example 5.1. Consider an industry where demand is given by D = 100 − p for
p ∈ [0, 100] and costs are null for any production level. Consider there is a monopolist
with 93 units of capacity that has to be split-up into three firms. The capacity
allocations (36, 36, 21), (35, 30, 28) and (31, 31, 31) are examples of options (a), (b)
and (c) above respectively. The maximum equilibrium prices yielding from each
alternative are p = 27 for option (a) and p = 25 for options (b) and (c). Prices below
the Cournot price, such as p = 21, can also yield in option (b) (see Example 4.2)
while p = 25 is the only equilibrium price in option (c). Therefore, the highest price
yielding from option (b) is not higher than the ones yielding from options (a) and (c)
and, since in option (c) there are multiple equilibria, the price could be lower. Thus,
options (b) would seem the best choice.
16To simplify, it will be assumed that the total capacity is larger than the Cournot output.
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5.2 Merger policy
The results of this paper are also helpful for merger policy analysis. They indicate
that, in some cases, mergers leading to asymmetric industry structures may yield
prices lower than mergers leading to symmetric industry structures. This is illustrated
by Example 5.2.
Example 5.2 also illustrates the possibility that the post-merger equilibrium price
be lower than the pre-merger equilibrium price (even in the absence of efficiency
gains.) The explanation of this result is that when the firms resulting from a merger
are sufficiently asymmetric, prices below the Cournot price can be sustained by
CPSFE, and that such prices may be even lower than the Cournot price of the pre-
merger industry.
Example 5.2. Consider the industry (D,C, {1, 2, 3, 4} , k) where C (q) = 0 for q ∈ R,
D (p) = 100 − p for p ∈ [0, 100], and k = (35, 30, 28, 16). Note that firm 4 does
not have enough capacity to produce the (unconstrained) Cournot quantity (which
is equal to 20) and then N¯ = {1, 2, 3}. The industry ¡Dk,{1,2,3}, C, {1, 2, 3}¢ where
Dk,{1,2,3} (p) = 84−p satisfies the conditions in Theorem 4.4 and therefore the capacity
constrained-Cournot outcome
(p¯, q¯1, q¯2, q¯3, q¯4) = (21, 21, 21, 21, 16)
is the only outcome that can be sustained by CPSFE.
Assume firms 1 and 4 merge. Then the industry becomes (D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k0)
where k0 = (51, 30, 28). The outcome
(p0, q01, q
0
2, q
0
3) = (18, 36, 18, 28)
is a possible CPSFE outcome —see Example 4.7. Note that p0 < p¯, i.e. the equilibrium
price after the merger is lower than the price before the merger. After the merger,
there are multiple outcomes that can be sustained by CPSFE and some of them yield
prices lower than the pre-merger price. Therefore, even in the absence of efficiency
gains, a merger does not necessarily imply higher prices.
Turning back to the initial situation, consider now the merger of firms 3 and
4. Then the industry becomes (D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k00) where k00 = (44, 35, 30). In this
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industry the capacity-constrained Cournot outcome
(p¯00, q¯001 , q¯
00
2 , q¯
00
3) = (25, 25, 25, 25)
is the only outcome that can be sustained by CPSFE (since conditions 4.4.1 and
4.4.2 are satisfied.) Note that this merger would result in a more symmetric industry
structure than the previous one and would lead to a unique CPSFE outcome implying
a higher price. This merger would also yield a price higher than the pre-merger price.17
The previous example shows that (a) mergers leading to asymmetric industry
structures yield prices not higher than mergers leading to symmetric industry struc-
tures; and (b) if the post-merger capacities are sufficiently asymmetric, the post-
merger prices may be even lower than the pre-merger prices (even in the absence of
efficiency gains.)18
This implies that one of the standard remedies of merger policy such as capacity
divestiture through the transfer of capacity to smaller competitors may not always
be appropriate since this measure increases symmetry and may lead to the existence
of a unique outcome that can be sustained by CPSFE.
Capacity asymmetries have been shown to have similar effects in different con-
texts. Comte et al [6] analyze a model of Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition with
exogenous capacity constraints and show that asymmetric distributions of capacities
make collusive outcomes more difficult to sustain in an infinite period game. They
conclude that mergers increasing capacity asymmetry may result in lower prices.
Their conclusions are therefore in line with the previous example.
In practice policymakers do not always take into account the particularities of mar-
ket design when analyzing the existence of market power and, in particular, in the
analysis of mergers. For example, in Europe the analysis of mergers in the electricity
industry (where firms compete via supply functions) has basically relied on standard
concentration indices.19 In the US, the energy regulator FERC has detected the dif-
ficulty of predicting market outcomes from industry structure in electricity wholesale
17Note however that p¯0 (which equals p¯00) may also be sustained by CPSFE in the industry
(D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k0).
18Note however that, since multiple equilibria exist, this result depends on which market equilib-
rium yields.
19See, for example, cases IV/M.1606 EDF/South Western Electricity, IV/M.1803 Electra-
bel/EPON, COMP/M.3007 E.ON/TXU Europe Group and COMP/M.2209 EDF Group/Cottam
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markets and has proposed specific rules for the assessment of market power in such
markets (see, e.g., section VI in [8].)
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Let s ∈ SFE (D,C,N, k) such that p (s) < p¯. Without
loss of generality, let k = (k1, ..., k1).
Assume k1 ≤ q¯ (D,C,N). Then, there is a unique outcome that can be sustained
by SFE, in which all firms produce at full capacity. That is, p (s) = p¯(D,C,N, k)
and qi (s) = q¯(D,C,N, k) = k1 for all s ∈ SFE (D,C,N, k) where p¯(D,C,N, k) = p¯
is the solution to the equation nk1 = D (p¯).
Assume k1 > q¯ (D,C,N).
Recall N (s) = {i ∈ N | qi (s) < ki}. Consider two possibilities:
First, suppose N (s) ≡ N, i.e., qi (s) < k1, for all i ∈ N . Then, the capacity
constraints play no role and s ∈ SFE (D,C,N). Since n ≥ n∗, thus, π¯ (D,C,N, k) =
π¯ (D,C,N) > πi (s) for all i ∈ N and then s /∈ CPSFE (D,C,N, k).
Next, assume N (s) ⊂ N . It is shown that for any s ∈ SFE (D,C,N, k) one
can construct a strategy sˆ such that sˆ ∈ SFE (D,C,N) and such that it results
in the same market outcome as s, i.e. p (sˆ) = p (s) and qi (sˆ) = qi (s) ∀i ∈ N .
Since for n ≥ n∗, the Cournot outcome Pareto-dominates any other equilibrium
outcome in the industry (D,C,N), then sˆ /∈ CPSFE (D,C,N) and, consequently,
s /∈ CPSFE (D,C,N, k).
Recall equilibrium condition Ei and write αi = r0i (p). Condition Ei becomes
qi +

D
0 (p)−
X
j∈N(s)
j 6=i
αj

 (p− C
0(qi)) = 0, for i ∈ N (s) ,
and
k1 +

D0 (p)−
X
j∈N(s)
αj

 (p− C 0(k1)− λ) = 0, for i ∈ N\N (s) .
Power Station. In EDF Group/Cottam Power Station it is mentioned that the fact that the market
price is determined through a pool mechanism could require a closer analysis. However, since no
dominant position is said to be created or strengthened in any case, no further analysis is performed.
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I then construct a strategy sˆ ∈ SFE (D,C,N) such that p (sˆ) = p (s) and qi (sˆ) =
qi (s) ∀i ∈ N . For i ∈ N , consider the system of equations
qˆi +
Ã
D0 (pˆ)−
X
j 6=i
αˆj
!
(pˆ− C 0(qˆi)) = 0 (4.1)
and set pˆ = p (s), qˆi = qi (s) ∀i ∈ N (s) and qˆi = k1 for i ∈ N\N (s).
Thus, X
j 6=i
αˆj =
p− C 0(k1)− λ
p− C 0(k1)
X
j∈N(s)
αj, for i ∈ N\N (s) , (4.2)X
j 6=i
αˆj =
X
j∈N(s)
j 6=i
αj for i ∈ N (s) .
The system of equations 4.2 is a linear system with n equations and n unknowns. I
show that the system has a unique solution (αˆ1, ..., αˆn) where αˆi ≥ 0 for i ∈ N , thereby
showing that the system of equations 4.1 characterizes a SFE and, consequently,
sˆ ∈ SFE(D,C,N).
Note that αˆi = αˆj = αˆ ∀i, j ∈ N\N (s) and that, since qi (s) < k1 ∀i ∈ N (s),
we have αˆi > αˆ for i ∈ N (s). Write φ = p−C
0(k1)−λ
p−C0(k1) . Note that 0 < φ ≤ 1. Rewrite
system 4.2 as a system of n (s) + 1 equations given byX
j∈N(s)
αˆj + (n− n (s)− 1) αˆ = φ
X
j∈N(s)
αj, (4.2a)X
j∈N(s)
j 6=i
αˆj + (n− n (s)) αˆ =
X
j∈N(s)
j 6=i
αj ∀i ∈ N (s) . (4.2bi)
Hence, adding equations 4.2bi over i ∈ N (s) yields the equation
(n (s)− 1)
X
j∈N(s)
αˆj + n (s) (n− n (s)) αˆ = (n (s)− 1)
X
j∈N(s)
αj.
Solving for
P
j∈N(s) αˆj,X
j∈N(s)
αˆj =
X
j∈N(s)
αj − (n− n (s))
µ
1 +
1
(n (s)− 1)
¶
αˆ,
and substituting in equation 4.2 a,
αˆ = n (s)− 1
n− 1 (1− φ)
X
j∈N(s)
αj,
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and since 0 < φ ≤ 1, then αˆ ≥ 0. Thus, since as αˆi > αˆ for i ∈ N (s), then αˆi > 0.¤
Example 4.2. The strategy profile sˆ is self-enforcing if sˆ ∈ SFE(D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k)
and if for all i ∈ N , sˆN\{i} ∈ CPSFE
¡
Dsˆ,N\{i}, C,N\ {i} , k
¢
where Dsˆ,N\{i} (p) =
D (p)− sˆi (p). Finally, sˆN\{i} ∈ CPSFE
¡
Dsˆ,N\{i}, C,N\ {i} , k
¢
if
sˆN\{i} ∈ SFE
¡
Dsˆ,N\{i}, C,N\ {i} , k
¢
and there is no s˜ ∈ SFE
¡
Dsˆ,N\{i}, C,N\ {i} , k
¢
satisfying πi (s˜) > πi (sˆ) for i ∈ N .
It is easy to show that sˆ is self-enforcing. It is already known that
sˆ ∈ SFE(D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k). It is mechanical to show that fixing Firm i’s strategy,
there exists no s˜ ∈ SFE
¡
Dsˆ,N\{i}, C,N\ {i} , k
¢
satisfying πi (s˜) > πi (sˆ) for i ∈ N .
Next, to show that there is no self-enforcing strategy s˜ ∈ SFE (D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k)
such that πi (s˜) > πi (sˆ) for i ∈ N , one has to show that there is no strategy s˜ ∈
SFE (D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k) such that πi (s˜) > πi (sˆ) for i ∈ N .
Since sˆ is self-enforcing and there is no self-enforcing strategy s˜ such that πi (s˜) >
πi (sˆ) for i ∈ N , then sˆ ∈ CPSFE(D,C, {1, 2, 3} , k).
Proof of Proposition 4.3. The proof follows immediately from the definition of
CPSFE: if a strategy profile is a CPSFE, then such strategy profile should also be a
CPSFE of the game played by any subcoalition of players.
Let s ∈ SFE (D,C,N, k). Recall N (s) = {i ∈ N | qi (s) < ki} and n (s) =
#N (s). Define
Ds,N(s)(p) =



D(p)−
P
i∈N\N(s) ki if D(p)−
P
i∈N\N(s) ki ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
Let s ∈ CPSFE(D,C,N, k) be such that p (s) < p¯(Dk,N¯ , C, N¯) and n (s) ≥ n∗.
Consider the coalition M ≡ N (s), write m for the cardinality of M and write sM
for the strategy profile of the members of M . Holding fixed the strategies of the
members of the complementary coalition, sN\M , the situation the group of firms in
M faces can be modeled as that of an industry (Ds,M , C,M, k). It is shown that
the members of the coalition M can all improve by deviating to a strategy resulting
in the Cournot outcome. Therefore, s /∈ CPSFE (Ds,M , C,M, k) and by definition
s /∈ CPSFE(D,C,N, k).
Since m = n (s) ≥ n∗, Delgado and Moreno [7] show that,
p (s) q (s)− C (q (s)) < π (p¯ (Ds,M , C,M)) ,
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and since Ds,M (p) = D (p) −
P
i∈N\M ki ≥ D (p) −
P
i∈N\M ki −
P
i∈M\M¯ ki, where
M¯ are the firms in M that have enough capacity to produce the Cournot quantity,
then, ∀i ∈ M¯
p (s) qi (s)− C (qi (s)) < π (p¯ (Ds,M , C,M)) ≤ πi (p¯ (Ds,M , C,M, k)) .
Also, since, ∀i ∈M , qi (s) < ki
p (s) qi (s)− C (qi (s)) < p¯ (Ds,M , C,M, k) ki − C (ki) , ∀i ∈M\M¯.
Thus, πi (p¯ (Ds,M , C,M, k)) > p (s) qi (s)− C (qi (s)) ∀i ∈M .
Then s /∈ CPSFE (Ds,M , C,M, k) and sinceM ⊂ N then s /∈ CPSFE (D,C,N, k).¤
Proof of Theorem 4.4. First it is shown that if either condition 4.4.1 or condition
4.4.2 holds then the Cournot outcome Pareto-dominates any other SFE outcome and,
since the Cournot outcome can be sustained by CPSFE, the Cournot outcome is the
unique outcome that can be sustained by CPSFE.
Without loss of generality consider n¯ = n.20 Note that the assumption n¯ = n,
implies that every firm has enough capacity to produce the Cournot quantity of the
industry without capacity constraints q¯(D,C,N) i.e., ki ≥ q¯(D,C,N) = a−bcn+1 for
i ∈ N .
As shown in Proposition 4.3, any SFE at which there are three or more firms which
capacity is not binding, is not CPSFE. Therefore, the search of additional CPSFE
can be restricted to the family of SFE in which at least Firms {3, ..., n} produce
at full capacity. If it can be shown that no CPSFE leading to an outcome other
than Cournot exists within this family, then identical result holds when any other
n − 2 firms produce at full capacity, since the “residual demand” left by any other
combination of any n− 2 firms will be smaller for each price.
Let s˜ ∈ SFE(D,C,N, k) where qi (s˜) = ki for i > 2,21 and let
sˆ ∈ SFE
¡
Dk,{1,2}, C, {1, 2} , k
¢
, whereD{1,2} (p) = D (p)−
P
i>2 ki, such that π1 (sˆ) ≥
π1 (s) for all s ∈ SFE
¡
Dk,{1,2}, C, {1, 2} , k
¢
. Note that, by definition of sˆ, π1 (sˆ) ≥
π2 (sˆ). It is shown that if any of the conditions of the theorem holds, then π¯ (D,C,N) >
π1 (sˆ) ≥ πi (s˜) ∀i. Thus, s˜ /∈ CPSFE (D,C,N, k).
20If this assumption is not imposed, the proposition would hold by replacing the demand function
a− bp by the residual demand a− bp−
P
i>n¯ ki and by using n¯ instead of n.
21Note that if a− bc−
P
i>2 ki ≤ 0, then no SFE of this class exists.
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Assume Condition 4.4.1 holds. Then, k1 <
1
2
¡
a− bc−
P
i>2 ki
¢
. By Lemma A
in the Appendix, q1 (sˆ) = k1 ≥ ki ∀i > 2. Then, π1 (sˆ) ≥ (p (sˆ)− c) ki ∀i > 2. By
Lemma B in the Appendix, π¯ (D,C,N) > π1 (sˆ). Therefore, π¯ (D,C,N) > π1 (sˆ) ≥
πi (s˜) ∀i. And thus, s˜ /∈ CPSFE (D,C,N, k).
Assume Condition 4.4.2 holds. Then, k1 ≥ 12
¡
a− bc−
P
i>2 ki
¢
. By Lemma A
in the Appendix, q1 (sˆ) =
1
2
¡
a− bc−
P
i>2 ki
¢
. Since k1 ≥ 12
¡
a− bc−
P
i>2 ki
¢
and
a − bc −
P
i>2 ki > 0 then kj <
1
2
¡
a− bc−
P
i>2 ki
¢
= q1 (sˆ) for j 6= 1, 2. Then,
π1 (sˆ) ≥ (p (sˆ)− c) ki ∀i > 2. By Lemma B in the Appendix, π¯ (D,C,N) > π1 (sˆ).
Therefore, π¯ (D,C,N) > π1 (sˆ) ≥ πi (s˜) ∀i. And thus, s˜ /∈ CPSFE (D,C,N, k).
Next, I show that if conditions 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 do not hold, then there exists
at least one alternative outcome that can be sustained by CPSFE and does not
yield the Cournot outcome, i.e., there exists sˆ ∈ CPSFE (D,C,N, k) such that
p (sˆ) < p¯ (D,C,N, k) . The proof is mechanical and will only be sketched.
Assume k1 < bk and Pi>2 ki ≤ a− bc− k1− bk2k1 , i.e. condition 4.4.1 does not hold.
Proceeding as in Example 4.2 —see Appendix— it can be proved that the strategy sˆ
such that
sˆ1 (p) = k1 ∀p,
sˆ2 (p) =



bp if p < k2
b
,
k2 if p ≥ k2b ,
sˆi (p) = ki ∀p for i > 2
is self-enforcing and that there is no self-enforcing strategy s˜ such that πi (s˜) > πi (sˆ)
for i ∈ N . Therefore sˆ ∈ CPSFE (D,C,N, k).
Assume k1 ≥ bk and Pi>2 ki ≤ a − bc − 2bk, i.e. condition 4.4.2 does not hold.
Proceeding as in Example 4.2 —see Appendix— it can be proved that the strategy sˆ
such that
sˆ1 (p) =
a− k3 − bc
2
∀p,
sˆ2 (p) =



bp if p < k2
b
,
k2 if p ≥ k2b ,
sˆi (p) = ki ∀p for i > 2
is self-enforcing and that there is no self-enforcing strategy s˜ such that πi (s˜) > πi (sˆ)
for i ∈ N . Therefore sˆ ∈ CPSFE (D,C,N, k).¤
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Lemma A. Let (D,C, {1, 2} , k) be a linear industry where D (p) = a − bp − Γ,
C (q) = cq, k = (k1, k2), Γ is an arbitrary constant such that a − bc − Γ > 0 and
ki ≥ q¯ (D,C, {1, 2}) = a−bc−Γ3 . Let (p∗, q∗1, q∗2) be the outcome that maximizes Firm
1’s profits on the set SFE (D,C, {1, 2} , k).
(a) If k1 ≥ 12 (a− bc− Γ), then q∗1 =
(a−bc−Γ)
2
and π1 (p∗, q∗1, q∗2) = 18b (a− bc− Γ)
2.
(b) If k1 <
1
2
(a− bc− Γ), then q∗1 = k1 and π1 (p∗, q∗1, q∗2) = 12
¡
a−bc−Γ−k1
b
¢
k1.
Proof. Delgado and Moreno [7] show that for every SFE of an industry (D,C,N) one
can find a SFE in a class in which all but (perhaps) one firm supply inelastically the
output of the firm with the greatest profits (and output) at the original equilibrium.
Moreover, this equilibrium leads to a price that is greater than or equal to the price
associated to the original equilibrium. Consequently the profits of the firms using an
inelastically supply are greater or equal than those of the firm with the largest profit
at the original equilibrium.
This implies that when looking for Firm 1’s profit maximizing equilibrium out-
comes in the industry (D,C,N) the search can be restricted to the SFE of this class.
In the linear industry (D,C, {1, 2}) these are characterized by the system of equa-
tions:
q1 − (b+ α) (p− c) = 0,
q2 − b (p− c) = 0.
Consider the linear industry (D,C, {1, 2} , k). Under capacity constraints, the system
of equations becomes
q1 − (b+ α) (p− c) ≥ 0, (A.1)
q2 − b (p− c) ≥ 0, (A.2)
q1 ≤ k1, (A.3)
q2 ≤ k2. (A.4)
where A.1 and A.2 hold with equality for q1 < k1 and q2 < k2 respectively. Therefore,
using the market clearing condition, Firm 1’s profit function can be written as a
function of q1 :
π1 (q1) =
µ
a− bc− Γ− q1
2b
¶
q1 for q1 ≤ k1.
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Note that α ≥ b
³
2q1
1−q1 − 1
´
which is greater than or equal to zero for q1 ≥ a−bc3 .
Therefore, π1 (q1) is well defined for q1 ≥ a−bc3 . Also note that q2 =
a−bc−q1
2
is
decreasing in q1 and q2 ≤ q1. Therefore, since k2 ≥ 13 , Firm 2’s capacity is never
binding.
The function
¡
a−bc−Γ−q1
2b
¢
q1 is increasing in q1 and reaches its maximum at q1 =
a−bc−Γ
2
. Therefore, if k1 ≥ a−bc−Γ2 , π1 (q1) is maximum at q1 =
a−bc−Γ
2
and π1
¡
a−bc−Γ
2
¢
=
1
8b
(a− bc− Γ)2. If k1 < a−bc−Γ2 , π1 (q1) is increasing for all feasible q1 and therefore
is maximized at q1 = k1 and π1 (k1) =
¡
a−bc−Γ−k1
2b
¢
k1.¤
Lemma B. Let (D,C,N, k) be a linear industry. Consider the industry¡
Dk,{1,2}, C, {1, 2} , k
¢
where Dk,{1,2} > 0. Let sˆ ∈ SFE
¡
Dk,{1,2}, C, {1, 2} , k
¢
such
that π1 (sˆ) ≥ π1 (s) for all s ∈ SFE
¡
Dk,{1,2}, C, {1, 2} , k
¢
. If
B.1. k1 < bk and Pi>2 ki > a− bc− k1 − bk2k1 , or
B.2. k1 ≥ bk and Pi>2 ki > a− bc− 2bk;
then π1 (sˆ) < π¯ (D,C,N) .
Proof. Recall bk = √2
n+1
(a− bc) .
B.1. If k1 < bk and Pi>2 ki > a − bc − k1 − bk2k1 , then k1 < 12 ¡a− bc−Pi>2 ki¢. By
Lemma A (replacing Γ =
P
i>2 ki),
π1 (sˆ) =
1
2
µ
a− bc−
P
i>2 ki − k1
b
¶
k1.
Using the conditions on k1 and
P
i>2 ki:
π1 (sˆ) <
1
2b
Ã
(a− bc− k1)−
Ã
a− bc− k1 −
bk2
k1
!!
k1
=
1
b
µ
a− bc
n+ 1
¶2
= π¯ (D,C,N) .
B.2. If k1 ≥ bk andPi>2 ki > a−bc−2bk, then k1 ≥ 12 ¡a− bc−Pi>2 ki¢. By Lemma
A (replacing Γ =
P
i>2 ki),
π1 (sˆ) =
1
8b
Ã
a− bc−
X
i>2
ki
!2
.
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Using the conditions on k1 and
P
i>2 ki,
π1 (sˆ) <
1
8b
Ã
1− 1 + 2
√
2
n+ 1
!2
(a− bc)2
=
1
b
µ
a− bc
n+ 1
¶2
= π¯ (D,C,N) .
¤
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